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Abstract
This Article draws upon, but reworks, John Rawls’ framework from Political Liberalism to 
determine the degree of educational autonomy that illiberal perfectionist religious groups 
ought to enjoy in a liberal state.  I start by arguing that Rawls mistakenly concludes that 
political liberalism flatly cannot accommodate Perfectionists, and that his misstep is 
attributable to two errors:  (1) Rawls utilizes an overly restrictive “political conception of the 
person” in determining who participates in the original position, and (2) Rawls overlooks 
the possibility of a “federalist” basic political structure that can afford significant political 
autonomy to different groups within a single country.  With these insights, I argue that some, 
though not all, religious Perfectionists are consistent with a stable liberal polity, and explain 
why foundational Rawlsian premises require that Perfectionists be accommodated to the 
extent possible.
My ultimate conclusions are that liberal polities ought to grant significant autonomy to 
those illiberal groups that satisfy specified conditions, and that the autonomy of such 
“eligible” illiberal groups is subject to two further constraints, which I call “well-orderedness” 
and “opt-out.”  The autonomy to which eligible Perfections are entitled includes the authority 
to educate their children in a way that provides a fair opportunity for the groups to 
perpetuate themselves.  The constraint of well-orderedness, however, permits the State to 
impose educational requirements that facilitate peace and political stability.  Accommo-
dating eligible illiberal groups, subject to these constraints, is an instantiation of liberal 
commitments, not a compromise of liberal values.
Keywords
Rawls; Political Liberalism; political conception of the person; federalism; perfectionism; 
education; exit; Kymlicka; Sen; Waldron
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The scope of the educational autonomy of religious groups in a democratic 
state is one facet of the larger question of how liberal polities should deal 
with illiberal1 communities in their midst. This is not to suggest that all 
religious communities are illiberal, but only that the most difficult ques-
tions in the field of education arise with respect to illiberal religious com-
munities. I believe the answer is best approached as follows.2 A cornerstone 
of liberal democracy is that governmental authority rests on citizen con-
sent. But because it is unrealistic to expect that each generation should 
establish a new constitution that remakes government to reflect the con-
sent of that generation, and for other reasons as well,3 the most that can be 
expected is hypothetical consent. My approach to determining the govern-
ing structure to which citizens hypothetically consent builds upon John 
Rawls’s framework in Political Liberalism, though it deviates from it in some 
important respects. It also draws on important contributions by Will 
Kymlicka, Jeremy Waldron, and Amartya Sen.
Briefly, I claim that (a) foundational commitments require that liberal 
polities grant significant autonomy to those illiberal groups that satisfy cer-
tain (relatively narrow criteria, but that (b) the autonomy of such “eligible” 
illiberal groups is subject to two constraints that I call “well-orderedness” 
and “opt-out.” The autonomy to which they are entitled includes the 
authority to educate their children in a way that provides a fair opportunity 
for the groups to perpetuate themselves. Accommodating eligible illiberal 
groups, subject to the two constraints, is an instantiation of liberal commit-
ments, not a compromise of liberal values.
The essay proceeds as follows. Part I identifies some insights from 
Amartya Sen’s recent book that are particularly relevant to this essay’s 
1 I do not intend to provide a formal definition of “illiberal,” but I am referring roughly 
to groups that are structured along patriarchal, theological, racist, classist, or homopho-
bic lines. Such groups tend to reject core liberal commitments associated with such values 
as equality and the liberty of individuals to choose their role and station in life. It may 
be argued that what I refer to as “illiberal” groups can be characterized as embracing 
liberal values, albeit differently understood from the way contemporary secular regimes 
understand liberal values. The present paper does not consider such arguments, but assumes 
instead that some religious groups espouse values deeply antagonistic to liberalism, and 
considers the degree to which foundational liberal commitments impel liberal regimes to 
accommodate such “illiberal” religious groups.
2 I began exploring many of the ideas that are developed here in two previous works: 
“The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance: A Liberal Theory”, 84 Virginia Law 
Review 1053–1144 (1998), and ““Illiberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American Consti-
tutionalism”, 12 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 803–842 (2002).
3 See R. Barnett, The Presumption of Liberty (2004).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2186229 
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contractarian argument. Part II considers the implications for religious 
groups of Kymlicka’s well-known defense of minority cultural rights. In so 
doing, Part II defends Kymlicka’s argument against several trenchant criti-
cisms by Jeremy Waldron, and also points out some respects in which 
Kymlicka’s framework needs to be enriched.
Part III, the core of this essay, suggests that Rawls’ Political Liberalism, 
properly understood, provides an appropriate framework for determining 
the degree of educational autonomy that illiberal religious groups ought to 
enjoy in a liberal state. But Part III is not a straightforward application of 
Rawls’ framework, for it argues that Rawls mistakenly concludes that politi-
cal liberalism cannot make room for Perfectionists. Rawls’ mistake is attrib-
utable to two errors: his “political conception of the person” is too restrictive, 
and he overlooks the possibility of a “federalist” basic political structure 
that can afford significant political autonomy to different groups within a 
single country. With these insights, Part III argues that some, though not all 
religious Perfectionists are consistent with a stable liberal polity, and 
explains why foundational Rawlsian premises require that Perfectionists 
be accommodated to the extent possible. Part III then explains how these 
conclusions implicate the question at hand concerning the educational 
autonomy of religious groups. The essay closes with a short conclusion.
My framework does not purport to provide a comprehensive set of con-
siderations that appropriately inform the scope of educational autonomy 
of religious communities in every liberal state. Longstanding compromises 
and practices, past historical injustices, and what is practically necessary to 
maintain political stability may be relevant factors in some circumstances. 
But the perspective provided by political theory is important, even if 
not determinative. Among other things, the understanding afforded by 
political theory allows an appreciation of what costs, if any, are entailed 
when a polity elects to give religious groups some measure of educational 
autonomy.
I. The Continuing Relevance of Social Contractarian Approaches 
to Choosing Institutions
My approach in considering illiberal groups’ educational autonomy in lib-
eral polities is of the social contractarian type, in the tradition of Rousseau, 
Locke, and Kant. Before proceeding, I feel it is important to respond to an 
argument recently put forth by Amartya Sen in his new book The Idea of 
Justice. Sen rejects contractarianism and champions instead what he claims 
to be an alternative stream of non-contractarian enlightenment writers 
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4 See A. Sen, The Idea of Justice 86 (2009).
5 Although Sen’s 400-plus page book is far too deep and wide for me to provide anything 
approaching an adequate treatment here, I feel it necessary to address several arguments he 
propounds that have direct relevance to the questions addressed in this paper.
6 See Sen, supra note 4, at 68, 84–85.
7 Ibid.
8 See Sen, supra note 4, at 69–71. Moreover, virtually all of Sen’s firepower is directed at 
Rawls’ second principle of justice, which concerns distributive justice. Sen and others con-
vincingly disprove Rawls’ claim that reasonable people would unanimously adopt the differ-
ence principle by identifying a set of plausible alternative principles. The analysis I 
undertake concerns Rawls’ first principle of justice – the priority of liberty – with which Sen 
is largely in agreement.
9 For example, there is no reason why contractarianism cannot take account of people’s 
actual behavior and the actual consequences of governmental institutions. See Sen, at 68. 
Indeed, it seems that doing so would only strengthen contractarianism. Similarly, Sen 
inveighs against the contractarians’ tendency to neglect the wisdom that can come from 
looking at the experiences of people outside the political community that is the subject of 
the social contract. See Sen, supra note 4, at 70. But there is nothing inherent in contractari-
anism that demands such ethnocentricism, and again, expanding the range of consider-
ations can only be expected to improve contractarianism.
10 For example, Sen convincingly argues that justice can impose obligations in matters 
that do not fall within the jurisdiction of any governmental institutions. For example, one 
that includes, according to Sen, Adam Smith, Condorcet, Wollstonecraft, 
Bentham, Mill, and Marx. Sen assimilates these writers into what he calls a 
social choice theory-inspired approach to justice.4 A response to Sen’s 
thoughtful critique is therefore appropriate for one such as myself who 
continues to rely on contractarianism.5
Sen makes many important points. He rightly critiques the contractari-
ans’ tendency to equate justice with the identification of a unique, “tran-
scendentally” ideal set of governmental institutions.6 Sen argues instead 
that any account of justice must take into consideration the actual “social 
realizations” of institutional arrangements, which turn not only on institu-
tions but on how people in a given society behave.7 Moreover, Sen persua-
sively argues that rather than focusing on perfect institutions to which 
citizens unanimously would assent, much can be gained through a more 
minimalist approach that aims to eliminate or minimize universally recog-
nized injustices (such as famine and slavery). The argument I provide below 
draws on Sen’s constructive criticisms at several junctures.
But Sen oversells the implications of his arguments vis-à-vis contractari-
anism. Rather than slaying contractarianism,8 Sen’s barrages highlight ways 
in which it should be reworked9 and establish that contractarianism is an 
incomplete tool for determining what justice requires and that conse-
quently requires supplementation.10 But Sen’s approach does not displace 
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the need for contractarianism. Sen acknowledges the enduring significance 
of governmental institutions,11 but his approach neither explains how gov-
ernmental institutions should be chosen nor why their exercise of power is 
legitimate. Although Sen rightly inveighs against the contractarians’ exclu-
sive focus on institutions, a full theory of justice must guide the choice of 
institutions and justify their exercise of power. Contractarianism performs 
these important functions, and performs them well: the cornerstone of 
contractarianism is that citizens’ consent legitimizes the choice of institu-
tions and their exercise of power, and I suspect that this idea reflects a 
broad consensus in liberal states.
Indeed, it is not at all clear that Sen himself abandons contractarianism, 
although I cannot fully demonstrate this here. After all, the vehicle that 
transports readers to all Sen’s conclusions about what justice demands is 
public reasoning.12 But why does public reasoning impose duties? Sen does 
not directly answer this question.13 One possibility is that the demands of 
justice are somehow self-animating. This sounds quite natural law-like,  and 
at the very least requires a justification that Sen does not supply. Another 
possibility is that Sen relies on unstated contractarian assumptions, equat-
ing the conclusions of public reasoning with what people would agree to.
However Sen answers the question of why the conclusion of public rea-
son imposes (or identifies) the duties of justice, in the end there may not be 
much gap between Sen’s reliance on public reason and the hypothetical 
consent that Rawls and I invoke.
II. Kymlicka, Waldron’s Critique, and the Need for a Richer Framework
A. Kymlicka
Before coming to the Rawlsian framework that comprises my main 
argument, I briefly examine Will Kymlicka’s powerful and elegant 
argument in defense of protecting minority cultures because it has ready 
implications for religious communities.14 Kymlicka’s argument turns on his 
can speak of the requirements of justice in connection with transnational and global phe-
nomena without necessarily requiring the creation of transnational or global institutions.
11 Sen, supra note 4, at 82.
12 See, e.g., Sen, supra note 4, at 324 (“From earlier chapters of this book, it should be clear 
how central the role of public reasoning is for the understanding of justice”).
13 Sen comes closest to doing so in pages 31–51, yet even there a response to the question 
identified above in the text is more assumed than provided.
14 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 70–169 (1995).
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understanding of the role that “societal culture” plays in an individual’s life. 
Kymlicka claims that societal culture “provides its members with meaning-
ful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both 
public and private spheres.”15 Cultures are “embodied in social life” by being 
“institutionally embodied” in schools, the media, the economy, and 
government.16 This type of embodiment accounts for the critical role that 
societal culture plays in shaping its members.17
According to Kymlicka, access to a societal culture is a precondition to 
freedom. “[F]reedom involves making choices amongst various options, 
and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes 
them meaningful to us.”18 As a result, “[f]or meaningful individual choice to 
be possible, individuals need… access to a societal culture.”19 This is because 
“[p]eople make choices about the social practices around them, based on 
their beliefs about the values of these practices… [a]nd to have a belief 
about the value of a practice is, in the first instance, a matter of understand-
ing the meanings attached to it by our culture.”20
On the basis of this understanding of societal culture, Kymlicka argues 
that denying persons access to their societal culture is unjust because it 
violates the fundamental liberal values of liberty and equality.21 That is to 
say, whereas people in the majority culture have access to their own soci-
etal culture and the freedom to make meaningful choices among options 
that the dominant societal culture provides, people in minority cultures, 
who are not afforded access to their societal cultures, lack this freedom of 
choice. That the majority culture permits those from minority cultures to 
adopt the majority’s societal culture is not sufficient to counter this inequal-
ity because most people are strongly attached to their particular societal 
culture.22 The fact that they can adopt another culture is too costly a pre-
condition to the exercise of freedom to make it just to deny them access to 
their own societal cultures.23








23 Ibid., at 86. Kymlicka correctly notes that this conclusion, which is based on general-
izations about human needs, is unaffected by the fact that some individuals might elect to 
abandon the culture into which they were born and adopt another. Ibid.
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B. Waldron’s Critique
Jeremy Waldron has sharply criticized Kymlicka’s argument as “guilty of 
something like the fallacy of composition.”24 Waldron believes that 
“Kymlicka’s argument shows that people need cultural materials,” but does 
not establish that people need a single cultural framework that serves the 
purposes Kymlicka’s claims. According to Waldron, Kymlicka’s argument 
fails because cultures are not pristinely distinctive, but instead are mélanges 
drawn from disparate cultural sources. From this, Waldron argues, it follows 
that
the ethical importance of cultural wholes or integrated cultural frameworks 
is thrown into question. With it goes the idea that it is important for each 
person to be related to a secure and integrated framework via her membership 
in some community in particular… A person needs cultural meanings; but she 
does not need a homogeneous cultural framework.25
Put more bluntly, Waldron thinks he has demonstrated that “membership 
in a particular community, defined by its identification with a single cultural 
frame or matrix, has none of the importance that Kymlicka claims it does.”26
But Waldron’s argument hardly undermines Kymlicka’s claim. Even if 
Waldron is correct that most cultures contain elements that originated in 
other cultures, his argument falls short of establishing his conclusion 
because it neglects the fact that the receiving culture may have adapted  
the foreign elements. Indeed, there is strong empirical evidence that this 
phenomenon of “adapted adoption” (as I dubbed it elsewhere) is wide-
spread.27 The process of adapted adoption has several components. The 
receiving culture may literally rework the meaning of the foreign element.28 
The receiving culture must also necessarily determine what weight or 
importance is to be ascribed to the foreign element, particularly when it 
24 J. Waldron, “Multiculturalism and Melange”, in R.K. Fullwider (ed.), Public Education in 
a Multicultural Society 102 (1996).
25 Ibid., at 104.
26 J. Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, 25 U. Mich. J. L. 
Reform 751, 786 (1991–1992) (emphasis added).
27 M.D. Rosen, “Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: 
Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act”, 69 Fordham Law Review 479 (2000). 
Similarly, it is well established that Catholicism differs greatly between (for instance) Africa, 
the Scandinavian countries, and France.
28 For example, biblical scholars have long explained that the Hebrew Bible reworked 
ancient near-Eastern myths so that they reflected Israelite conceptions of the Divine. See, 
e.g., J.L. Kugel, How to Read the Bible, 69–80 (2007).
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stands in tension, or conflicts with other parts of the recipient culture. 
In these respects, adapted adoption is a process of integrating the foreign 
element so that it coheres with the rest of the receiving culture, even if in 
doing so it alters the receiving culture.
The process of adapted adoption helps explain why the mere fact 
that there are shared elements among cultures does not undermine 
Kymlicka’s claim that cultures are meaningfully distinctive in the sense that 
persons (many, at least) would feel harmed if they did not have access to 
their culture. To give some concrete examples, Jewish culture remains 
meaningfully distinctive even if (a) the Passover Seder was modeled on 
Greek and Roman festive banquets and (b) the biblical author(s) borrowed 
from the Epic of Gilgamesh when composing the story of Noah and the 
flood. Similarly, Islamic culture is meaningfully distinctive even if both 
Islamic and Jewish law have similar dietary restrictions, and even if both 
religious traditions define the start of day as the time when a person is 
able to distinguish between two differently colored threads. In short, cul-
tures can be meaningfully distinctive even if they share some common 
elements.
Consider Waldron’s further critique of Kymlicka. Waldron argues that
[n]one of us needs to be immersed in one of the small-scale communities 
which, according to Kymlicka and others, are alone capable of securing this 
integrity and homogeneity. Some, of course, still may prefer such immersion, 
and welcome the social subsidization of their preference. But it is not, as 
Kymlicka maintained, a necessary presupposition of rational and meaningful 
choice.29
This critique rests on a misapprehension of Kymlicka’s argument. Kymlicka 
does not claim that everyone needs to be raised in the culture of a small-
scale community. Indeed, Kymlicka’s equality argument implicitly acknowl-
edges that there can be a societal culture at the level of a large country. 
Kymlicka’s argument is that people who belong to a sub-culture must be 
given access to their particular (sub) cultures if they are to have liberty 
equal to that of members of the larger societal culture. For Kymlicka, 
belonging to some culture is a presupposition of rational and meaningful 
choice, not necessarily belonging to a small culture.
Although Waldron fails to show that Kymlicka’s approach is premised on 
a logical fallacy, his arguments are illuminating for our purposes. First, they 
show that he and Kymlicka share some important common ground: 
29 J. Waldron, supra note 26.
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Waldron accepts Kymlicka’s claim that culture is very important for people 
at least insofar as “choice takes place in a cultural context, among options 
that have culturally-defined meanings.”30 Second, both Kymlicka and 
Waldron recognize that their political theories rest on non-axiomatic (and 
therefore contestable) theories of personhood.31 In Waldron’s well-chosen 
words, even “a theory of toleration or liberal neutrality” requires a “thin 
theory of choice, agency, and responsibility.”32 Juxtaposing Kymlicka’s and 
Waldron’s theories concretely demonstrates how even a “thin” theory of 
personhood is invariably “controversial.”33 The extent to which there can be 
controversy even with regard to such a “thin” theory is shown in Part III(B), 
which contrasts Kymlicka’s and Waldron’s understandings with Rawls’s 
rather different theory of personhood.
C. The Need for a Richer Framework
Kymlicka makes a powerful argument for affording significant autonomy 
to minority cultures. Less well worked out and less convincing are two 
exercises of group power that he believes to be illegitimate under liberal 
premises. The first of these is what Kymlicka calls “internal restrictions,” 
that is, the “demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or politi-
cal liberties of its own members.”34 Kymlicka is unfortunately vague about 
the contents of “civil and political liberties,” although he seems to equate 
them with the “freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the 
traditional practices of their community.”35 He backtracks somewhat, how-
ever, concluding that internal restrictions sometimes may be “justified, on 
a temporary basis, where they are required to protect the society from lit-
eral disintegration.”36 The second type of activity that Kymlicka claims is 
30 Ibid., at 102.
31 See Waldron, supra note 26, at 759 (“Any political theory . . . must be predicated on 
some view of what human life is like.”); Kymlicka, supra note 14, at 87, 90 (the reasons for 
people’s strong bonds to their culture “lie deep in the human condition [and are] tied up 
with the way humans as cultural creatures need to make sense of their world, and [ ] a full 
explanation would involve aspects of psychology, sociology, linguistics, the philosophy of 
mind, and even neurology”).
32 Waldron, supra note 26, at 760.
33 Ibid., at n.30.
34 Kymlicka, supra note 14, at 152.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., at 230 n.i (“Some restrictions on individual freedom within the minority com-
munity may be justified, on a temporary basis, where they are required to protect the society 
from literal disintegration.”).
 M.D. Rosen / Journal of Law, Religion & State 1 (2012) 16–44 25
inconsistent with liberal theory is “external restrictions” that “oppress or 
exploit other groups.”37
Not only is there uncertainty as to the precise contents of Kymlicka’s 
“internal” and “external” restrictions, but Kymlicka’s framework neither 
offers a principled reason why minority cultures should be subject to 
these constraints nor why they should not be subject to additional limita-
tions. Rawls is a much more systematic thinker, and his richer framework 
provides a more principled method for identifying the appropriate limits 
to  the autonomy of minority cultures. (Interestingly, as we soon shall 
see,  the appropriate limitations that flow from a Rawlsian framework 
track Kymlicka’s “internal” and “external” restrictions. The Rawlsian frame-
work, though, provides considerably more guidance in specifying their 
content).
There is another respect in which Kymlicka’s framework is inadequate. 
Even if a minority culture desires to impose what Kymlicka deems to be 
impermissible internal or external restrictions, Kymlicka concludes that 
the majority liberal culture does not have the power to “coercively impo[se] 
liberalism.” Rather, the liberal state can only “offer[] various incentives for 
liberal reforms” to “self-governing national minorities” within the liberal 
state.38 Kymlicka concludes that liberal states ought to relate to illiberal 
groups in the way that liberal states relate to illiberal countries or to illiberal 
groups located in other countries.39 Kymlicka is less committal regarding 
other minority cultures, concluding that “[a] more complicated case 
involves long-standing ethnic or religious sects who have been allowed to 
maintain certain illiberal institutions for many years, even many genera-
tions.”40 These conclusions strike me as overly accommodating of illiberal 
minority groups insofar as there may be some practices that liberal polities 
may legitimately elect not to accommodate. Again, Rawls’s more system-
atic framework facilitates a fleshing out of these types of limitations, and 
I address them below in Part III(E)-(F).
III. The Original Position and the Just State
We are now in a position to proceed to Rawls’s analytical framework in 
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Waldron’s understandings of culture, as well as to Sen’s informative cri-
tiques of contractarianism.
A. The Original Position and the Presumptive Need to Accommodate 
Religious Communities
John Rawls’s project in Political Liberalism is to describe the basic structure 
of a stable and enduring democratic constitutional regime that can win the 
wholehearted support of a citizenry having a plurality of irreconcilable 
“comprehensive doctrines.”41 Rawls famously elucidates the basic structure 
of political society using the heuristic device of the “original position.” 
Under the original position, people are to identify the fair political struc-
ture by conceiving themselves as being under a “veil of ignorance” under 
which they “do not know the social position, or the conception of the good 
(its particular aims and attachments), or the realized abilities and psycho-
logical propensities, and much else, of the persons they represent.”42 
Because
the parties do not know whether the beliefs espoused by the persons they 
represent is a majority or a minority view… [t]hey cannot take chances by 
permitting a lesser liberty of conscience to minority religions, say, on the 
possibility that those they represent espouse a majority or dominant religion 
and will therefore have an even greater liberty. For it may also happen that 
these persons belong to a minority faith and may suffer accordingly. If the 
parties were to gamble in this way, they would show that they did not take the 
religious, philosophical or moral convictions of persons seriously, and, in 
effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or moral conviction was.43
The veil of ignorance is therefore a heuristic for enabling people to tran-
scend their self-interests in order to identify a just and fair political 
structure. Stated differently, the veil of ignorance transforms personal self-
interest into society-wide interest: People in the original position choose a 
political structure that maximally accommodates others because they do 
not know whom they actually represent, and accordingly do not want to 
risk creating a polity that did not accommodate whomever it is they hap-
pened to be.
It follows that people in the original position would not “gamble”44 by 
selecting a political structure that might preclude them from living in 
41 J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 784 (1997).
42 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 305 (1996).
43 Ibid., at 311 (emphasis supplied).
44 Ibid.
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accordance with their religious convictions. In Rawls’s words, allowing 
autonomy for only select persons’ conceptions of the good would consti-
tute a “gamble [that would] show that [the person in the original position] 
did not take the religious, philosophical or moral convictions of persons 
seriously and, in effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or 
moral conviction was.”45 A rational person would not do such a thing.
All this has implications for the question at hand. For many, the freedom 
to live in accordance with one’s religious convictions presupposes the exis-
tence of a religious community of which they are a part, and derivatively, 
an educational system that can sustain the community. The political struc-
ture chosen under the original position would accordingly be one that 
afforded religious communities the autonomy to educate their children so 
that their community can be perpetuated.
This conclusion, however, is subject to several caveats that are best orga-
nized under two categories. First, the members of some religious traditions 
may not be permitted to “sit at the table” and participate in the original 
position, and therefore the chosen basic political structure may not accom-
modate them. I discuss the criteria for drawing the line between participat-
ing and excluded religious traditions in Parts III(B) to III(D). Second, even 
regarding the participating religious traditions, the original position sug-
gests that people would not conclude that participating religious traditions 
would have unlimited autonomy. Rather, the participants in the original 
position, not knowing whether they represented (participating) religious 
persons or non-religious persons, would opt for what Rawls calls the “first 
principle of justice,” which constitutes a generous but non-absolute grant 
of liberty to self-actualize in accordance with what a person believes self-
actualization requires. I examine these caveats in Parts III(E) –III(F).
B. Participants in the Original Position: Rawls’s “Political Conception  
of the Person”
Rawls carefully defines who it is that is imagined to be a participant in the 
original position: it is the “the political conception of the person” that is 
“drawn on in setting up the original position.”46 That is to say, when “we” 
imagine ourselves in the original position, laboring to identify the struc-
ture  of the just society, the “we”s that we have in mind are those who 
conform to the political conception of the person.47 Defining the political 
45 Rawls, supra note 43.
46 Ibid., at 29.
47 Ibid.
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conception of the person (PCP) is therefore critical to the Rawlsian enter-
prise, for it is only people who satisfy the conditions of the PCP whose 
interests must be taken into account when setting up the basic structure of 
the just state. Persons who fall outside the PCP are not guaranteed that 
their interests will be protected; nobody in the original position will neces-
sarily aim to protect their interests because people in the original position 
need not consider that they may be representing such persons.48
Rawls’s PCP is importantly different from the understanding of person-
hood found in Kymlicka’s account, and to the extent that Waldron shares 
Kymlicka’s understanding of the importance of culture, from Waldron’s as 
well. The PCP “begins from our everyday conception of persons as the basic 
units of thought, deliberation, and responsibility.”49 Under it, people are 
“seen as capable of revising and changing [their conception of the good] on 
reasonable and rational grounds, and they may do this if they so desire.”50 
Rawls’s PCP hence does not appear to take account of the role played by 
societal culture in shaping people’s perceptions and deliberative processes. 
To fully understand the different theories of personhood held by Kymlicka 
and Rawls, consider that, in Kymlicka’s account, culture goes so far as to 
bound the scope of plausible options among which most individuals make 
choices. For Kymlicka,
[t]he freedom which liberals demand for individuals is not primarily the 
freedom to go beyond one’s language and history, but rather the freedom to 
move around within one’s societal culture, to distance oneself from particular 
cultural roles, to choose which features of the culture are most worth 
developing, and which are without value.51
The mere fact that Rawls’s PCP incorporates a contested theory of per-
sonhood does not disqualify his theory; as Waldron convincingly argues, all 
political theories are premised on contestable theories of personhood.52 
The important question is whether the particular theory of personhood 
that Rawls chooses, and the people with different theories of personhood 
whom Rawls thereby excludes from participation in designing the just 
state, is wise and justifiable.
48 Ibid., at 103.
49 Ibid., at 18 n.20.
50 Ibid., at 30; see also Ibid., at 31–32.
51 Kymlicka, supra note 14, at 90–91.
52 Waldron, supra note 26, at 759.
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C. Should (Some) Illiberal Religious Groups Participate in the Original 
Position?
As discussed above, the PCP “begins from our everyday conception of per-
sons as the basic units of thought, deliberation, and responsibility.”53 Under 
it, people are “seen as capable of revising and changing [their conception of 
the good] on reasonable and rational grounds, and they may do this if they 
so desire.”54 Though it may appear that the PCP makes only minimalist 
assumptions, some religious traditions, and maybe many, do not share its 
understanding of personhood. Whereas the PCP assumes that individuals 
are the “basic units of thought,” some religious traditions take the view that 
people’s ideas, values, and very identities are deeply shaped by the polities 
in which they live.55 Call this “Government Socialization.” Some religious 
traditions also appear to reject Rawls’s assumption that individuals are the 
“basic units of . . . responsibility,” and instead adopt what may be called an 
understanding of “Interconnected Welfare,” which maintains that an indi-
vidual’s prospects for self-actualization are inextricably connected to how 
other individuals in the community behave and (perhaps even) believe.56 
The theory of personhood that gives rise to Government Socialization and 
Interconnected Welfare often, but not necessarily, leads to the view that 
government must play an extensive role in its citizens’ lives, in other words, 
it leads to “Perfectionism.” Perfectionists believe that society, including 
government, must actively promote a thick understanding of the “good” if 
its citizens are to be in a position to fully self-actualize.
Whether a traditional Rawlsian would exclude members of a particular 
religious tradition from participating in the original position ultimately 
turns on the definition of “basic units of thought… and responsibility.” 
My argument in this paper is that members of many (perhaps most) reli-
gious traditions should be included in the original position. It matters not 
for present purposes whether this is accomplished by construing “basic 
units of thought… and responsibility” sufficiently broadly to include those 
53 Rawls, supra note 42, at 20.
54 Ibid., at 30; see also Ibid., at 31–32 and 302.
55 Similar ideas have been put forward by Will Kymlicka, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, 
and Charles Taylor.
56 This notion is well captured in the Talmudic dictum of “cal yisrael arevim zeh la’zeh.” 
Babylonian Talmud Tractate Shavu’oth 39a. This means that all coreligionists “are as sureties 
for one another” in spiritual matters. In other words, just as a surety must pay for the insol-
vency of another, one co-religionist is accountable for the spiritual wrongdoing of another.
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who hold some version of Government Socialization and Interconnected 
Welfare, or by broadening the PCP on the ground that Rawls’s definition is 
unnecessarily restrictive. But because I believe that Rawls’s definition of 
PCP is most readily understood as excluding theories of personhood that 
give rise to Government Socialization and Interconnected Welfare, I think 
it more accurate to say that Rawls’s definition is unnecessarily restrictive 
and ought to be modified to include many perfectionist religious groups.
There are two reasons why perfectionist religious traditions should not 
be excluded per se from the original position. First, including them, to the 
extent possible, is demanded by foundational liberal commitments. 
Consistent with the views of most liberals, Rawls agrees that a liberal polity 
should be as neutral as possible, that is to say, as inclusive as possible of 
“comprehensive doctrines.”57 The theory of personhood that gives rise to 
Government Socialization and Interconnected Welfare grows out of a com-
prehensive doctrine quite different from that which underwrites the PCP.58 
Political liberalism would not be true to its core commitments if its polity 
afforded liberty only to “others who think just as we do.” If possible, people 
holding both comprehensive doctrines should be included in the original 
position.
Second, there are powerful pragmatic reasons59 why people holding 
both comprehensive doctrines should be included, if possible. In many 
57 Rawls, supra note 42, at 198 (acknowledging that one could justly object if “the well-
ordered society of political liberalism fails to establish, in ways that circumstances allow . . . 
a just basic structure within which permissible forms of life have a fair opportunity to main-
tain themselves and to gain adherents over generations”).
58 I recognize that Rawls claims that his project is premised on a political doctrine rather 
than a comprehensive philosophical or moral doctrine (see, e.g., Rawls, supra note 42, at xv), 
but this distinction is difficult to maintain if, as others have recognized (see, e.g., J. Waldron, 
supra note 26, at 759), Rawls’s political doctrine proceeds on the basis of a contestable, non-
axiomatic theory of personhood.
59 Do pragmatic reasons “count” from an internal Rawlsian perspective? If not, I am con-
tent to throw my lot with Sen and advocate that what we should do is aim for incremental 
improvements in justice rather than perfect justice, see A. Sen, supra note 4, at 106, and that 
an incremental improvement can be obtained by maximizing the number of participants in 
the original position (with the qualifications discussed above in the text). But it seems to me 
that such pragmatic considerations are agreeable to a Rawlsian. After all, many aspects of 
the Rawlsian framework accept contemporary realities as a given rather than look to a 
transcendentally utopian but pragmatically unreachable state of afffairs. A good example 
is the assumption that animates Rawls’s entire project, namely, that the existence of a 
“diversity of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in democratic 
societies is a permanent feature of the public culture and not a mere historical condition
 M.D. Rosen / Journal of Law, Religion & State 1 (2012) 16–44 31
countries today significant populations of people hold theories of person-
hood more in line with Government Socialization and/or Interconnected 
Welfare. It makes sense, therefore, to design a basic political structure that 
accommodates them, which is best done by allowing them to participate in 
the original position,60 if it is possible to do so.
But then why should anybody be excluded from participation in the origi-
nal position? Would it not be better if it were wholly inclusive?
There are two reasons for excluding some people from participation in 
the original position: one is legitimate, the other is not. The legitimate rea-
son is that deciding who is included in the original position is another way 
of determining who is to be part of a country’s political community.61 It is 
not unreasonable to conclude that some people have views and values that 
make it impossible to share political community with them. This reason 
suggests, however, that exclusions from participation in the original posi-
tion ought to be made only rarely, and that there should be a strong pre-
sumption of inclusion, particularly regarding persons who already dwell in 
the midst of a given country.62
Rawls’s political conception of the person excludes a broader range of 
people than those with whom it would be impossible to share a political 
community. Why does he take such an approach? It seems akin to reverse 
soon to pass away.” This takes as a given the borders that define existing states and that join 
heterogeneous populations under the banner of a single country, and aims to devise the best 
polity under these (not necessarily ideal) circumstances. Indeed, as best as I can tell, Rawls 
makes no effort to determine an ideal size of a polity, or to suggest criteria that ideally inform 
how membership in a political community should be determined (tasks that did not elude 
other political theorists with whom Rawls had intimate familiarity, such as Plato). 
Accordingly, Rawls’s project accepts important “facts on the ground” as a given and aims to 
create the best possible political structure given these facts, but not necessarily the most 
perfect political structure imaginable. There is no reason, therefore, to assume that the prag-
matic considerations adduced above fall outside a Rawlsian framework.
60 Although it is theoretically possible for people to be accommodated without partici-
pating in the original position (insofar as participants could plausibly conclude to design a 
political structure that accommodates non-participants), any such accommodation-
notwithstanding-exclusion is a second-best for two reasons. First, participation in the origi-
nal position is what grounds the legitimacy of governmental authority insofar as the 
participants, and only they, can be said to have given their consent. Second, the underlying 
logic that motivates the heuristic device of the original position is that the basic political 
structure is better chosen by the transformation, under the veil of ignorance, of narrow self-
interest into society-wide interest than by relying on others to look out for one’s interests.
61 See Rawls, supra note 42, at 300-302.
62 Such a presumption of inclusivity is an aspect of Rawlsian political liberalism, but not 
necessarily of all liberal polities. I do not here pursue further this important point.
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63 Rawls, supra note 42, at 299. Sen observes this point concerning unanimity as well. 
See Sen, supra note 4, at 59.
64 Nevertheless, I do not explore it further here because it extends beyond the limited 
subject of this essay.
engineering: Rawls wants to conclude that his two principles of justice 
would be unanimously agreed upon by participants in the original posi-
tion,63 but he can obtain unanimity only by limiting those who can partici-
pate in the original position. It seems to me that this is not a legitimate 
justification for exclusion, for three reasons.
First, the claim of unanimity is sophistry if unanimity is achievable only 
by limiting who participates. Second, exclusion in order to achieve (an illu-
sion of) unanimity masks an important problem: since unanimity is not 
actually possible, what should be done with those who never agree to soci-
ety’s baseline rules? This concern is particularly acute in respect to people 
already living within a country, especially if they are citizens.64
Third and most important for present purposes, the PCP excludes more 
than is necessary. A stable liberal polity can be achieved without excluding 
all persons who fall outside of the PCP. This can best be seen by eschewing 
Rawls’s attempt to achieve unanimity through reverse-engineering, and 
instead proceeding as follows. Let us assume that the first principle of jus-
tice is fair and extraordinarily well thought-out (even if it does not com-
mand unanimous assent), and let us consider what groups can be 
accommodated consistently with the first principle. In other words, rather 
than stacking the deck, by exclusion, to achieve unanimity among partici-
pants in the original position, let us be more inclusive about who can 
participate in the original position, and let us exclude from accommoda-
tion only those who cannot satisfy the requirements of the first principle. 
As I show in the next subsection, proceeding this way demonstrates that 
some people falling outside the PCP can be, and therefore should be, accom-
modated in a stable liberal polity.
Two objections to this proposal can be anticipated. First, broadening the 
PCP in the manner I suggest would make it impossible to derive the first 
principle of justice because one must start with certain assumptions about 
people before one can determine what political principles they would 
assent to. To answer this objection, I agree that one must start with some 
assumptions concerning personhood, but the assumptions held by some 
Perfectionists are not necessarily inconsistent with the first principle of jus-
tice. That is to say, people in the original position, understanding that they 
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65 In the next section of this essay I distinguish two types of Perfectionists: Localist and 
Universalist. The first principle of justice would be chosen only by Localist Perfectionists. 
Therefore, the more precise way of phrasing the point above in text is that people in the 
original position, not knowing whether they were non-Perfectionists or Local Perfectionists, 
would agree upon the first principle of justice.
66 For an illuminating discussion that explains why contrarianism is generally under-
stood to demand that a veto power be granted to all participants, see D.M. Estlund, 
Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, 57–237 (2008). Estlund rejects contrari- 
anism on the ground that a veto is unworkable, whereas I maintain a contractarian 
model while jettisoning the veto (at least insofar as veto power is understood to mean that 
all participants must be accommodated in the just polity), for reasons provided above in 
the text.
67 A full account of what justice demands would require a consideration of whether 
such groups ought to have a right to secede and to accordingly govern themselves indepen-
dently. This observation highlights a possible real-world cost of Rawls’s uncritical accep-
tance of the contemporary borders that define countries. See supra note 60.
may be representing Perfectionists or non-Perfectionists,65 would think it 
fair to create a basic political structure consistent with Rawls’s first princi-
ple of justice.
Second, an objection may be raised that my proposal undermines the 
logic of the original position in particular, and social contrarian approaches 
in general, insofar as it posits that participants understand that it would be 
impossible to accommodate some of the people they potentially represent 
in the resulting liberal state.66 But this objection is tautological; there is no 
good reason, apart from sheer definition, why participants in the original 
position would not be satisfied to create a maximally accommodating pol-
ity. This is particularly true because Rawls’s approach cannot be said to be 
wholly inclusive; Rawls also excludes people, albeit at the front-end (by 
means of his PCP) rather than the back-end (by virtue of what is agreed 
upon in the original position). Finally, this second objection is unavailing 
because, as it is made clear in the next section, my proposal excludes fewer 
people than does Rawls’s. Accordingly, the logic behind the second objec-
tion actually supports my proposal, and serves as an objection to Rawls’s.
D. Can Any Perfectionists Be Accommodated in the Liberal State?
Limiting participation to a narrowly construed “political conception of the 
person,” and excluding from the original position those religious groups 
that are committed to either Government Socialization or Interconnected 
Welfare, would be most readily justifiable (although still not necessarily 
justified67) if such exclusion were necessary to secure a stable liberal polity. 
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68 See Rawls, supra note 42, at 62; 196–197.
69 Ibid., at 291.
The claim that people who believed in Government Socialization or 
Interconnected Welfare necessarily had to be excluded, which I aim to 
refute below, presumably runs as follows. The theory of personhood that 
gives rise to Government Socialization and Interconnected Welfare natu-
rally leads to Perfectionism insofar as Perfectionists believe that govern-
ment must actively promote a thick understanding of the “good” if its 
citizens are to be in a position to fully self-actualize. On the assumption 
that citizens in a country frequently have divergent and at the same time 
reasonable comprehensive views, a government that pursued perfectionist 
ends not shared by all citizens would seem to invite sectarianism and sharp 
fissures. Moreover, forcing some citizens to adopt comprehensive views 
they do not share would be the antithesis of liberalism.
It is on the basis of these very reasons that Rawls explicitly concludes that 
liberal polities cannot tolerate Perfectionism.68 Rawls is mistaken, how-
ever, because political liberalism can and therefore should tolerate some 
Perfectionists, though not all. I explain why in two steps. Subsection 1 
explains why, under Rawls’s first principle of justice, Religious Perfection-
ists should be accommodated if possible. Subsection 2 explains why some 
Religious Perfectionists can be accommodated. This analysis is relevant 
to the question at hand because the most difficult questions concerning 
the educational autonomy of religious groups arise in respect to perfec-
tionist religious groups.
1. The Affirmative Case for Accommodating Perfectionists to the  
Extent Possible
The first principle of justice encompasses the liberty of citizens to self- 
actualize in accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires, 
to the extent that doing so is consistent with other citizens’ similar right 
to self-actualization – what may be called a reciprocal liberty to self- 
actualize. Creating a basic political structure that allows non-Perfectionists 
the opportunity to self-actualize in accordance with their views, but that 
does not afford the same opportunity to Perfectionists to the extent that 
this is possible, would violate the first principle of justice.
The first principle of justice is that “[e]ach person has an equal right to a 
[1] fully adequate scheme of [2] equal basic liberties which is [3] compati-
ble with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”69 The first principle of justice 
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70 Ibid., at 308.
71 Ibid., at 19.
72 Ibid., at 19, 333.
73 Ibid., at 19.
74 Ibid., at 35.
encompasses a presumptive need to accommodate Perfectionists for two 
reasons. First, as to subcomponent [3], Rawls states that “[t]he basic liber-
ties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, and so on)… are the 
background institutional conditions necessary for the development and 
the full informed exercise of the two moral powers,”70 one of which is the 
capacity to formulate a conception of the good.71 The first principle of jus-
tice thus presumptively requires that Perfectionists have access to what 
they require to develop their conception of the good.
There is a second reason why Perfectionists should be presumptively 
accommodated under the first principle of justice. Rawls states that a “fully 
adequate scheme” refers to the “criterion… to specify and adjust the basic 
liberties so as to allow the adequate development and the full and informed 
exercise of… [the] capacity for a sense of justice.”72 A sense of justice 
“expresses a willingness, if not the desire, to act in relation to others on 
terms that they also can publicly endorse.”73 As such, a “sense of justice” is 
connected to willing “compl[iance] with society’s basic institutions . . .”74 
Accommodating Perfectionists is consistent with the development of a 
sense of justice in Perfectionists because citizens are apt to willingly act in 
accordance with the basic structure of society if that structure allows them 
to live in accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires.
2. Which Perfectionists Can Be Accommodated?
Rawls mistakenly concludes that liberal polities cannot accommodate any 
Perfectionists because he overlooks the possibility of a federalist “basic 
structure” that would permit Perfectionists to dwell and maintain them-
selves in sub-federal polities. Rawls's arguments against the possibility of 
accommodating Perfectionist communities make sense only on the 
assumption that there exists only a single centralized government. For 
example, Rawls argues that a well-ordered democratic society cannot be a 
community, by which he means a
society governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 
moral doctrine. To think of a democracy as a community (so defined) overlooks 
the limited scope of its public reason founded on a political conception of 
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75 Ibid., at 42 (emphasis supplied).
76 W.C. Banby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell, 246 (2d ed., 1989) (noting that 
Pueblo tribal government and religious authorities are wholly intertwined); Kavena v. 
Hamilton, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6061, 6061 (Hopi Tr. Ct. 1988), aff ’d, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6063 (Hopi 
Tr. App. Ct. 1989) (“Hopi religion and village organization in the traditional village organiza-
tions is virtually inseparable. Membership in a village is in part religious as well as civil.”)
justice. It mistakes the kind of unity a constitutional regime is capable of 
without violating the most basic democratic principles.75
One may ask: Does the existence of so-called “Indian country” within the 
United States – where religious tribal governments are not subject to dises-
tablishment requirements with the result that religious institutions can 
exercise political power over a community united by shared religious 
beliefs76 – mean that the political structure of the United States violates 
“the most basic democratic principles?” The opposite is true: granting 
Native Americans political space within which they can largely self-govern 
to perpetuate their distinctive culture notwithstanding the country’s alien 
majority culture enhances liberal values by expanding the set of reasonable 
comprehensive views that can flourish. This logic can be generalized 
beyond the case of Native Americans: allowing islands of perfectionist 
communities within an ocean of liberal institutional and legal structures 
deepens the liberal character of society by increasing the chances that 
adherents of reasonable comprehensive doctrines can self-develop in 
accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires.
The possibility of perfectionist carve-outs means that it is possible to 
accommodate some, though not all forms of Perfectionism within political 
liberalism. In particular, political liberalism can and therefore should 
accommodate “Localist” Perfectionists. The only Perfectionists for whom it 
cannot make room are “Universalist” Perfectionists. Localist Perfectionists 
desire only that their local governments be empowered to pursue perfec-
tionist agendas, and are willing to allow other parts of society to be gov-
erned differently. There are two types of Localist Perfectionists. “Insular 
Perfectionists” do not think that the ideals and practices of their communi-
ties should be binding on those outside their community, but seek only to 
preserve themselves. This is true of many aboriginal communities. 
“Exemplary Perfectionists,” by contrast, hope to spur larger societal changes 
and alter the behavior of others outside their communities, but only by 
example, not by physical or political coercion. In sharp contrast to Localist 
Perfectionists, Universalist Perfectionists aim to achieve control of the 
machinery of the general (federal) government to compel others to live in 
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77 Considerations aside from principle may well lead people in a particular polity to con-
clude that even Universalist Perfectionists in their midst should be accommodated. Such 
accommodations, however, are properly understood to be violations, rather than vindica-
tions, of liberal commitments.
78 The normative argument why non-perfectionist religious groups should be accommo-
dated is different, however, than the argument regarding perfectionists, primarily because 
the needs for accommodations of non-perfectionists may be less pressing from their own 
perspectives than are the needs of perfectionists.
accordance with their views of the good. (The next section explains in 
greater detail why Universalist Perfectionists cannot be accommodated as 
a matter of liberal political theory.)77
Two other points deserve mentioning. First, the “federalist” structure 
that makes accommodating Localist Perfectionists possible does not neces-
sarily require physically separate spaces within which Local Perfection-
ists can live and isolate themselves. Rather, a sufficient federalist structure 
would be a government willing to shift some regulatory authority to the 
Perfectionist community. Such regulatory authority need not be exercis-
able in a discrete physical space in which no other (non-Perfectionist) gov-
ernmental entity had jurisdiction. To follow with the example of Indian 
country mentioned above, the state and federal governments exercise gov-
ernmental power in Indian country. Furthermore, many non-Indians live 
in Indian country. This paper is not the place to elaborate the particulars of 
what a federalist structure may look like, but it is important to note that it 
does not necessarily entail geographical isolation from general society.
Second, the foregoing analysis has important implications for the stance 
of political liberalism towards religious communities that require less 
accommodation than perfectionists do. If the outer marker of what politi-
cal liberalism can accommodate can extend to perfectionist religious com-
munities, then political liberalism can accommodate religious groups that 
require less.78
E. Limitation I: The Requirement of “Well-Orderedness”
In addition to requiring that Perfectionists be accommodated to the 
extent possible, the first principle of justice also contains constraints that 
(1) determine which Perfectionists cannot be accommodated and that 
(2) impose discrete but important limitations and obligations upon those 
Perfectionists that can be accommodated.
The first principle of justice is that “[e]ach person has an equal right to a 
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a 
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79 Banby, supra note 76, at 291 (emphasis added).




84 Rawls’ theory imposes significant educational requirements on secular communities 
as well. For an illuminating discussion, see E. Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education 
and Liberal Democracy (1997).
85 Moreover, there is no reason to think that this type of education would undermine the 
ability of minority societal cultures to survive. Such an education is not inconsistent with 
similar scheme of liberties for all.”79 “Fully adequate scheme” refers to the 
“criterion… to specify and adjust the basic liberties so as to allow the ade-
quate development and the full and informed exercise of both moral pow-
ers in the social circumstances under which the two fundamental cases 
arise in the well-ordered society in question.”80
The requirement of a “fully adequate scheme” imposes an important 
limitation on which Perfectionists can be accommodated and places con-
straints on those Perfectionists that can be accommodated. Rawls plausibly 
defines a “well-ordered society” to mean a polity in which “citizens have a 
normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with soci-
ety’s basic institutions, which they regard as just.”81 Well-orderedness thus 
is synonymous with conditions that permit and promote an “enduring and 
secure” political regime,82 thereby preserving one of liberalism’s foremost 
accomplishments of bringing about peace and avoiding sectarian conflicts 
of the sort found in the centuries-long European wars of religion.83 Well-
orderedness means that Perfectionists can be accommodated only if they 
have a peaceful disposition toward their non-Perfectionist neighbors. This 
is why Universalist Perfectionists cannot be accommodated. There is no 
reason, however, to think that Localist Perfectionists are inconsistent with 
a well-ordered society. On the contrary, their “localist” ideologies are fully 
consistent with well-orderedness.
Well-orderedness also entails substantive limitations on the activ-
ities  that qualifying Perfectionists can undertake. Among others, well- 
orderedness imposes important educational obligations. Those raised in 
religious perfectionist communities must be educated in a manner that 
encourages them to understand the justice of the polity in which they live, 
so that they willingly comply with the basic institutions of society.84 It may 
be necessary to teach citizens about the political theory that justifies the 
basic structure of society (helping them to understand the essentials of 
the argument developed here).85 It is also essential to equip them with the 
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the position advocated in this paper concerning the need to accommodate select minority 
societal cultures.
86 Professor Walzer’s contribution to this conference makes much headway on the cru-
cial issue of those attitudes and habits necessary for a stable liberal polity. Some of the spe-
cifics Professor Walzer identified in his public lecture, however, struck me as unnecessarily 
expansive. For example, Professor Walzer argued that democratic regimes require that their 
citizens reject “hierarchical arrangements” and freely decide political questions on their 
own. This appears to be an overly strict requirement insofar as many well-functioning 
democracies, including the United States, have had “voting blocs” in which citizens have 
taken their cues from religious or political leaders about whom they should support. This 
has been true, for instance, of the African-American community, the “Moral Majority,” and 
likely remains true for many mainstream Democrat and Republican voters in the United 
States. Although it is possible that a rejection of hierarchical arrangements may be neces-
sary in some countries because of the number of illiberal groups present and because of 
other context-specific considerations, it seems difficult to maintain that it is universally 
necessary.
87 See Sen, supra note 4, at 68, 84–85.
attitudes and habits required to achieve and secure a stable democratic 
polity. Such educational requirements do not seem to be inconsistent with 
the comprehensive doctrines that give rise to Localist Perfectionism.
Determining the precise contents of the “attitudes and habits” requisite 
for a stable democracy is a crucial task the details of which I cannot hope to 
flesh out here. But there is one important observation that can be made: 
the original position provides the appropriate framework for determining 
these details, suggesting that these requirements should be understood 
modestly rather than expansively because expansive “attitudes and habits” 
could lead to the unnecessary exclusion of some Perfectionists, which peo-
ple in the original position would not want to do.86
In the end, the education required by well-orderedness must be settled 
empirically, and likely will be a function of such context-specific factors as 
the background attitudes of a particular illiberal religious group, the num-
ber of illiberal groups in a given state, the proportion of the state popula-
tion that the illiberal group constitutes, and so forth. Sen’s argument that 
what matters is “actual social realizations”87 has particular bite here.
F. Limitation II: The Requirement of Opt-Out
The third component of the first principle of justice is that the basic struc-
ture be “compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.” This “compati-
bility” requirement confirms the need to accommodate Perfectionists to 
40 M.D. Rosen / Journal of Law, Religion & State 1 (2012) 16–44 
88 The compatibility requirement can be met only by allowing space for Perfectionists to 
self-actualize in accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires (to the 
extent possible). Not accommodating Perfectionists violates the compatibility requirement 
because such a non-accommodating polity would only allow non-Perfectionists the liberty 
of self-actualizing in accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires.
89 I pay no further attention here to the scope of opt-in rights because it is not directly 
relevant to the question at hand concerning the educational autonomy of religious groups. 
I have explored this issue in some detail elsewhere. See Rosen, supra note 27, at 824–826.
90 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241, 245–246 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be 
forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today … 
If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if his education 
is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed”).
the extent possible,88 but it also imposes some constraints on Localist 
Perfectionists. To satisfy the compatibility requirement, persons must have 
the right to choose in which community they can live. This entails both the 
option to “opt-out” of the environment in which they find themselves, and 
to “opt-in” to another.
To understand why, imagine a perfectionist community that sought to 
flatly prohibit its members from exiting. Persons living in a perfectionist 
community without sharing its commitments and who felt that remain-
ing  in the community impeded their ability to self-actualize would not 
enjoy the same liberty of exercising meaningful choice that is enjoyed by a 
person who lived in the majority societal culture and was satisfied by it. 
To make the liberty of members of perfectionist communities “compatible 
with a similar scheme of liberties” for those who do not identify with the 
perfectionist culture, people in perfectionist communities must have the 
ability to opt-out and leave the community into which they happened to be 
born and opt-in to a new culture.
Ensuring that members of a religious group have a meaningful right to 
opt-out has difficult educational implications and raises a host of other 
issues that are beyond the question at hand of educational autonomy.89 
The question is typically framed as follows: How much knowledge about 
life outside the minority culture, and how much training to support oneself 
and otherwise survive in the outside world, is necessary for the opt-out 
right to be real?90 The problem for opt-out is that the education provided 
by the perfectionist community typically valorizes its own culture and 
ignores or degrades others, thereby undermining the likelihood that its 
members will opt for the other. The question then becomes what are the 
prerequisites for the decision to remain in the minority societal culture to 
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be meaningful, so that the right to opt-out is meaningful and real, and not 
merely theoretical.
A useful way to begin to answer these questions is to refer back to the 
original position and ask what type of education is necessary for people to 
have meaningful opt-out rights. But first, we must acknowledge that such 
an approach cannot come close to fully answering these questions for sev-
eral reasons. On one hand, the heuristic of the original position does not 
provide the means for determining how risk-averse its participants are. For 
example, there have always been innovators who have been able to opt-out 
of the societies into which they were born simply by virtue of their intel-
lects, and many others for whom a sense of adventure and some degree of 
dissatisfaction with the status quo have sufficed to prompt them to leave 
their homes, as attested to by the vast history of immigration. For these 
people, the knowledge that there is an outside world, coupled with the 
absence of physical restraint, is sufficient to provide a meaningful opt-out 
right.
On the other hand, innovators and immigrants are the exception, not the 
norm. It might be suggested that persons in the original position should 
calibrate opt-out to more of a “median” risk-taking personality. This, how-
ever, invariably involves making contested psychological and sociological 
assumptions about the contents of such a median proclivity. Moreover, 
even assuming a consensus concerning the median personality, pegging 
opt-out to the median would be controversial because it would not provide 
adequate resources for persons below the median of risk-taking, who would 
be reluctant to leave the culture into which they have been born unless 
they were very well acquainted with the alternative culture and able to 
make a good living there.
This might lead one to suggest that opt-out should be calibrated to the 
most risk-averse, but this solution also comes at a cost. Educating children 
so that they can readily opt-out of the culture into which they were born 
would likely risk undermining the ability of that culture to perpetuate 
itself. This is particularly true for perfectionist cultures that believe that the 
proper road to self-actualization requires a long-term dedication to behav-
iors and practices that are difficult for most people at first. Such perfection-
ists might fear that too easy an opt-out option would entice community 
members away from the difficult but ultimately rewarding and correct path 
that community culture prescribes. For these reasons, educating children 
in a way that brings opt-out costs to zero would likely be rejected by people 
in the original position.
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91 Ibid., at 205, 245–46 (“It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that 
is imperiled by today’s decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade 
school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of 
diversity that we have today … If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in author-
ity over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.”)
Although it is difficult to concretely identify the educational prerequi-
sites of the opt-out requirement, it is possible to make some solid, useful 
observations. To begin, almost invariably there will be tension between the 
requirement of opt-out and the first-order educational preferences of a per-
fectionist community. The operative principle is that perfectionists can 
educate their children as they wish, subject to the caveat that people in the 
perfectionist communities be able to make informed life-style choices pur-
suant to non-perfectionists’ understanding of what informed decision-
making requires.
But what precisely does informed decision making require? Several 
things can be said. For one, meaningful opt-out does not mean that chil-
dren raised in perfectionist communities must be educated so that they 
can earn what they would have earned had they been raised outside the 
perfectionist community. Such a concern for diminished earning potential 
animated Justice Douglas’s partial dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the well-
known American case that exempted an Old Order Amish community 
from the state compulsory education law and permitted Amish children to 
be removed from school after the eighth grade.91 But Justice Douglas’s con-
cern is misplaced, and it is the eight other Justices’ understanding that is 
justifiable, because diminished earning power does not make opt-out a 
mere formality. Consider, for example, an Amish boy with native intelli-
gence that could have earned him admission to Harvard College had he 
been given a public high school education, but who received only an eighth 
grade Amish education and consequently could only obtain a job as a car-
penter if he elected to exit from the Old Amish order. The fact that the boy’s 
Amish education precluded him from obtaining a job as an investment 
banker upon graduation from Harvard is not relevant to ascertaining 
whether he has real or merely formal opt-out rights. What is relevant is his 
earning capacity as a carpenter outside his community, compared with 
what his standard of living would be were he to remain within the Amish 
community. The modest lifestyle of the Amish means that even an eighth-
grade education would make the opt-out rights real. More generally, the 
amount of education necessary to enable a community member to earn a 
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92 See, e.g., N.M. Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out: Assimilation, 
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education”, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 581 (1993); 
M. Halbertal, “Autonomy, Toleration, and Group Rights”, in D. Heyd (ed.), Toleration, 111–112 
(1996).
93 Rawls, supra note 42, at 200 (acknowledging that the type of education necessary to 
sustain the polity he envisions “is in effect, though not in intention, to educate [children] to 
a comprehensive liberal conception”).
94 Kymlicka, supra note 14, at 90.
95 The requirement of well-orderedness, however, may well place limits on the extent to 
which minority societal cultures can demonize other cultures in the process of educating 
their youth.
living outside the community for purposes of opt-out varies from commu-
nity to community, and it depends on the community’s standard of living.
It might be thought that subjecting children to a perfectionist environ-
ment in which they are deprived of access to certain books and perspec-
tives, and thereby socialized in a certain way, necessarily deprives them of 
the ability to make a fully objective choice as to whether they should 
remain or exit the community. But this view of opt-out is unsatisfactory 
because all environments, including non-perfectionist society, socialize 
children.92 Rawls himself reluctantly acknowledges this fact,93 and this 
insight lies at the heart of Kymlicka’s understanding of societal culture and 
of his assumption that people generally move around within their societal 
culture, not between or among cultures.94
Indeed, the view that cultures possess non-trivial socializing power that 
inclines their members to remain within them is not a deeply controversial 
proposition, and it has important implications for the requirements of opt-
out. If the typical effect of (even liberal) culture and education is to largely 
ensure that members remain within their societal cultures for their life-
times, and if people in the original position understand this to be the case, 
they would not think that opt-out is satisfied only when people can make 
fully autonomous choices to remain in their culture.95 People in the origi-
nal position may be satisfied with softer opt-out conditions, such as the 
absence of physical restraints and perhaps merely the knowledge that there 
exists a different world out there. Undoubtedly, more thought must be 
given to this important issue.
Proceeding to more controversial assumptions concerning personhood, 
if something like Kymlicka’s understanding of culture is correct, then the 
heart of opt-out is not a person’s ability to move from a perfectionist com-
munity to a non-perfectionist community or vice versa, but something else 
that is frequently overlooked. As noted above, Kymlicka argues that the 
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autonomy that liberalism presumes is the “freedom to move around within 
one’s societal culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to 
choose which features of the culture are most worth developing, and which 
are without value.”96 If this is so, people in the original position would be 
deeply concerned about having the right to move from one point to another 
within their particular societal culture — what we might call an “intra- 
cultural opt-out right.” This would have important educational implications 
for religious groups, for it suggests that they cannot enforce orthodoxies in 
order to preclude internal criticisms and reforms of their cultures. To be 
sure, state enforcement of intra-cultural opt-out rights itself would risk 
entangling the state in supervision of the religious group and may even trig-
ger concerns that the state was establishing religion in polities committed 
to non-establishment. I do not purport to definitively settle here the appro-
priate bounds of such an opt-out right, but only to flag the right and some 
issues it might implicate.
IV. Conclusion
The analysis in this essay suggests that people in the original position 
would think it fair to establish a basic political structure that allows many 
perfectionist groups, including many religious groups, to flourish, subject 
to the important but discrete limitations imposed by the requirements of 
well-orderedness and opt-out. A crucial implication of this analysis is that 
accommodating minority societal cultures is not simply something that is 
in the best interests of the perfectionist groups, but is in the best interest of 
general society. This is true because general society best lives up to its foun-
dational liberal commitments when it allows such groups space to largely 
rule their lives, subject to the limitations discussed above.
96 Ibid.
